

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 SS-15 SSO-00 ACDE-00 /028 W  
-----084576 111810Z /50

O 111739Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7547

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 06596

FOR ACDA, DR. BLECHMAN ONLY FROM PAJAK

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PCAT, PARM, UNGA, UK, GW, US  
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF CAT TALKS WITH UK AND FRG

BEGIN SUMMARY: TALKS WERE USEFUL, BUT UNFORTUNATELY VIS-A-VIS BRITISH, DID NOT MOVE PROCESS FORWARD OF WHERE IT WAS WHEN THEY WROTE THEIR PAPER. AS INITIAL IMPEDIMENT, BRITS HAD "NOT" READ OUR PAPERS IN ADVANCE. WE THUS HAD TO RECAP PAPERS IN DETAIL, WITH BRITISH GIVING INITIAL REACTIONS WITHOUT PRIOR DELIBERATIONS. BEYOND THAT, BRITS SEEMED TO TAKE HALF STEP BACKWARD OF WHERE THEY FORMERLY WERE ON ISSUES. GERMANS IN CONTRAST WERE REFRESHINGLY FORTHCOMING. HAD READ AND DIGESTED PAPERS AND WERE WILLING TO MAINTAIN DIALOGUE AND APPEARED ANXIOUS TO LEARN MORE OF OUR APPROACH. END SUMMARY.

1. UK DELEGATION LED BY JOHN WILBERFORCE, HEAD OF DEFENSE STAFF IN FOREIGN OFFICE. ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL MEMBERS EACH FROM FONOFF AND DEFENSE MINISTRY.

2. BRITS APOLOGIZED FOR DELAY IN RECEIPT OF PAPERS, WHICH WERE JUST BEING COPIED WHEN TALKS GOT UNDERWAY. THEY CONSEQUENTLY DID NOT HAVE ADVANCE OPPORTUNITY TO PONDER AND DIGEST THE INCONTROVERTIBLE LOGIC OF THE

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POINTS IN OUR PAPERS. AS WE RECAPPED THE PAPERS, BRITS LISTENED POLITELY (HAVE BEEN GOOD AT THAT LATELY), ASKED QUESTIONS, BUT REFLECTED EXTREME SKEPTICISM OVER OUR PURPOSES, THE GUIDELINES APPROACH, AND THRUST OF OUR ARGUMENTS.

3. ON WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES, BRITS SAW NO PROBLEM IN

CONTROLLING SUCH ITEMS AS SSM'S, INHUMANE WEAPONS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS WHICH THEY DO NOT PRODUCE. HOWEVER, THEY RAISED QUESTION OVER MANPODS, AS PERHAPS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR OUTRIGHT BAN BECAUSE OF URGENCY OF AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS IN SITUATION SUCH AS SOMALIA. (THEY ALSO MENTIONED HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, WHERE "BLOWPIPE" FACTORY IS LOCATED.) I RAISED ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY OF USING LESS PORTABLE SYSTEM, SUCH AS "RAPIER" SAM, BUT THEY REFERRED TO HIGH TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEM, AS WELL AS NECESSITY OF A FAIRLY FIXED BATTLE AREA. QUESTION LEFT OPEN FOR FURTHER STUDY.

4. THEY ASKED IF WE HAD ANY OTHER EXAMPLES OF WEAPONS FOR WORLDWIDE RESTRAINT. MANTEL REPLIED NO. (WE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STAY AWAY FROM SPECIFICS; ALSO INSTRUCTED "NOT" TO MENTION JAGUAR, UNLESS BRITS RAISED IT, WHICH THEY DID NOT.)

5. IN MATTER OF BOMBERS, BRITS AGREED BAN ON HEAVY BOMBERS COULD BE CONSIDERED. THEY ASKED WHETHER SUCH A BAN WOULD ALSO APPLY TO MRCA TORNADO. MANTEL REPLIED NO.

6. IN AREA OF "NUCLEAR CAPABLE" SYSTEMS, BRITS THOUGHT IT INFEASIBLE TO BAN AIRCRAFT BY TYPE OR MODEL, INASMUCH AS ALMOST ANY AIRCRAFT CAN BE USED FOR NUCLEAR DELIVERY. THEY PREFERRED TO REMOVE NUCLEAR DELIVERY RELEASE  
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MECHANISMS FROM SELECTED AIRCRAFT.

7. JOHN MERRILL, JCS, STATED THAT "WE" CONSIDERED IT IMPRACTICAL TO BAN BY TYPE NUCLEAR CAPABLE SYSTEMS, OR FOR THAT MATTER, WEAPONS CAPABLE OF USE BY TERRORISTS. AT THAT POINT, I JOCULARLY ALLUDED TO EXISTENCE WITHIN USG OF NUANCES OF DIFFERENCES AS TO HOW SUCH POSSIBILITIES ARE VIEWED.

8. BRITS ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS HAVE ANY EXPORT ON SUCH SYSTEMS. I REPLIED THAT SOVIET REFUSAL TO PROVIDE CERTAIN ADVANCED MISSILES OR AIRCRAFT TO SOME RECIPIENTS HAD ALREADY OCCASIONED STRAINS IN RELATIONS IN SOME SITUATIONS.

9. REGIONAL RESTRAINTS PROVED ONE OF LEAST FRUITFUL SEGMENTS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UK. BRITS STATED SUCH GUIDELINES PRESENTED THEM WITH ALL SORTS OF DIFFICULTIES

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FOR ACDA

AND MISGIVINGS. THEY FIRST OF ALL REFERRED TO THE LIKELY  
RELUCTANCE OF THE FRENCH TO CONSIDER SUCH RESTRAINTS  
BECAUSE OF THEIR ANTIPATHY TOWARD A "TRANSATLANTIC"  
SUPPRESSION OF ARMS SALES. BRITS ALSO AVERRED THAT  
IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEMSELVES TO PLACE  
RESTRICTIONS ON ITEMS THAT RECIPIENTS WANTED. WE TRIED  
TO ASSURE THEM THAT WE DID NOT EXPECT TO HOLD A VETO  
OVER SUCH REQUESTS, BUT ONLY TO HAVE CONSULTATIONS OVER  
PROPOSED SALES.

10. ON THE MATTER OF CONSULTATIONS, THE BRITS DID NOT  
WAX ENTHUSIASTIC. THEY BELIEVED THAT A SYSTEM OF  
"DISCREET ENQUIRIES" ALREADY EXISTED, E.G., OVER HORN  
OF AFRICA, TO OBIVATE DIFFICULTIES OF A RECIPIENT  
PLAYING OFF ONE SUPPLIER AGAINST ANOTHER. WE SUGGEST  
MOVING TOWARD GREATER SYSTEMATIZATION OF CONSULTATIONS,  
BUT THEY REMAINED COOL TO THE IDEA.

11. RECIPIENT RESTRAINTS SIMILARLY NOT VERY HOPEFUL.  
BRITS ALLUDED TO WEST AFRICA, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED PROBLEMS  
EVEN THERE. THEY SAID PERHAPS ONE COULD OBTAIN MORE OF  
AN IMPRESSION OF NONALIGNED THINKING AFTER THE SSOD.  
EVEN SO, BRITS REMAINED SKEPTICAL OF THE RECIPIENT  
APPROACH. BRITS ACKNOWLEDGED FRENCH INITIATIVE, BUT  
DID NOT YET SEE WHAT WAS IN IT.

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12. AS FOR RETRANSFER CONTROLS, BRITS SAID THEY ALREADY HAVE SUCH CONTROLS OVER GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY OVER THOSE OF PRIVATE FIRMS. THEY ARE LOOKING INTO STRENGTHENING THAT HOLD OVER THE LATTER.

13. IN COPRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS, BRITS SAID THEY ALREADY LIMIT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS. IN 99 OUT OF 100 TIMES, THEY HAVE RESTRICTED PRODUCTION IN RECIPIENT COUNTRY TO THAT COUNTRY'S OWN REQUIREMENTS, NOT ALLOWING RE-EXPORTS. THEY SAID THEY WERE NOT PERSUADED AT THIS TIME THAT THEY COULD GO BEYOND PARAGRAPHS 12-13 (?) OF THEIR 1977 PAPER.

14. AS FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE, BRITS SAID THEY WOULD RATHER BEGIN DISCUSSION WITH "ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES," RATHER THAN "EXPORT POLICIES." UNDER THE LATTER, THERE ARE TOO MANY VARIATIONS BETWEEN POLICIES OF DIFFERENT BRITISH GOVERNMENTS VIS-A-VIS INDIVIDUAL RECIPIENT COUNTRIES. THEY DID PROMISE TO DO A PAPER FOR US, COMPARABLE TO THE ONE THAT LES GELB PASSED THEM.

15. IN AREA OF NATIONAL ARMS EXPORT FIGURES, THEY CLAIMED THAT BECAUSE OF LARGE PRIVATE SECTOR IN ARMS INDUSTRY, THEY HAD NO COMPREHENSIVE FIGURES COMPARABLE TO OURS. THEY HAVE ESTIMATED SALES FIGURES FOR PAST YEARS, BUT NO ACCURATE DELIVERIES FIGURES BECAUSE THEY DO NOT RECEIVE SUCH DATA FROM FIRMS. THEY ARE LOOKING INTO THIS MATTER.

16. ON COMMUNIST ARMS DATA, BRITS THOUGHT GREAT DEAL OF INFO IS ALREADY BEING EXCHANGED. WE SAID THE AMOUNT OF INFO EXCHANGED HAS DWINDLED IN RECENT YEARS. THEY  
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WOULD REFER THIS MATTER TO THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

17. IN CLOSING THE TALKS, BRITS SUGGESTED THAT WE MORE FULLY ELABORATE ON GUIDELINES WITH "SPECIFIC" EXAMPLES. THE PROBLEM CENTERS AROUND ITEMS THAT RECIPIENTS WANT. THEY ALSO SEE IT DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE A SYSTEM OF CONSULTATIONS. IF THE SOVIETS, FRENCH, AND GERMANS AGREE TO CERTAIN GUIDELINES, THE BRITS WOULD NOT WISH TO LAG BEHIND. IN THE MEANTIME, BRITS SAID THE U.S. SHOULD FEEL FREE, AS THEY DO, TO EXPRESS OUR RESPECTIVE FEELINGS ON POSSIBLE TRANSACTIONS.

18. FOLLOWING OUR TALKS, "THE TEAM" WAS INVITED TO MEET WITH MR. FRANK JUDD, MINISTER OF STATE IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND DEPUTY TO OWEN. WE HAD AN ENJOYABLE

HALF HOUR CHAT WITH HIM.

19. ALTHOUGH A HALE FELLOW, WELL MET, HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH OUR PURPOSES IN COMING OR WITH THE GUIDELINES APPROACH IN GENERAL. IN ESSENCE HE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESTRAINT POLICY, BUT HE WONDERED IF, AS WITH SO MANY OTHER WORTHWHILE INTENTIONS, IT WOULD BE ERODED BY INTERNAL POLITICAL, LABOR, AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE, AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.

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FOR ACDA

20. GERMAN DELEGATION HEADED BY HERR PABSCH, DIRECTOR OF ARMS TRANSFER STAFF IN FONOFF. ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL MEMBERS EACH FROM FONOFF AND ECON MINISTRY.

21. ON GERMAN SIDE, PABSCH OPENED BY STATING THAT GERMANY RELATIVELY SMALL EXPORTER, ALTHOUGH SALES HAVE INCREASED IN LAST FEW YEARS. FRG POLICY SINCE LATE 1950'S WAS NOT SELL ARMS TO AREAS OF TENSION. BULK OF SALES GO TO NATO COUNTRIES.

22. GERMANS IMPRESSED WITH U.S. PAPERS AND WEALTH OF U.S. STATISTICS. THEY DO NOT HAVE COMPARABLE DATA.

23. THEY MADE POINT THAT INDUSTRY COULD BE PERSUADED OF THE MERITS OF RESTRAINT ONLY IF ALL EXPORTERS COULD AGREE ON LIMITATIONS. ALSO REGARDED AGREEMENT NOT TO SUBSTITUTE OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE. THEY AGREED IN

PRINCIPLE WITH HARMONIZING OF GUIDELINES, AND WOULD LIKE TO RE-MULTILATERALIZE TALKS ON RESTRAINT.

24. THEY WERE RECEPTIVE AS FAR AS WORLDWIDE GUIDELINES ARE CONCERNED. AMONG OTHER REASONS, THEY DO NOT PRODUCE MOST TYPES OF WEAPONS IN QUESTION.

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25. ON REGIONAL GUIDELINES, FRG FELT RESTRAINTS MIGHT BE EASIEST TO CONSIDER FOR AREAS SUCH AS LATIN AMERICA, "WHERE THERE IS NO TENSION." FRG WOULD HAVE TO RETAIN SOME FLEXIBILITY, BUT IN PRINCIPLE, WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO CONSIDERING SUCH GUIDELINES.

26. THEY ALSO SAW MERIT IN CONSULTATIONS. SAW TANKS AND AIRCRAFT AS CANDIDATES FOR DISCUSSION, BUT DID NOT MENTION SUBMARINES IN THIS CONNECTION. THEY FELT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR OTHER SUPPLIERS TO PLAY THE GAME. WOULD LIKE TO INCLUDE SOVIETS, BUT FRG UNCERTAIN WHETHER WOULD BE REALISTIC TO EXPECT THEIR COOPERATION. THEY WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT HAPPENS AT HELSINKI. WE PROMISED TO DEBRIEF THEM.

27. THEY LIKED IDEA OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, THEY WONDERED IF PROCESS OF EXCHANGE OR SOMETHING LIKE A UN REGISTER WOULD ITSELF SPARK INTEREST FOR EQUIPMENT AMONG RECIPIENTS. WE ASSURED THEM WE ONLY CONSIDERING INFO EXCHANGE AMONG SUPPLIER GOVERNMENTS AT THIS POINT.

28. GERMANS VERY FORTHCOMING ON DETAILS OF THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. WILL PREPARE A PAPER FOR US ON THE SUBJECT.

29. WE REFERRED TO FRG'S PRESENT ARMS EXPORT POLICY AS AN EXAMPLE OF RESTRAINT BY A MAJOR ARMS EXPORTER. THEY APPRECIATED THIS, BUT FEARED IT MAY BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR OWN INDUSTRY, IF SALES CONTINUE ON LARGE SCALE BY OTHER EXPORTERS.

30. GERMANS NOT OPTIMISTIC OVER RECIPIENT INITIATIVES. IF ALL SUPPLIERS AGREE, NO NEED FOR RECIPIENT ARRANGE-

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MENTS. BUT IF ALL CANNOT AGREE, THEN MAY BE SOME MERIT IN CONSIDERING REGIONAL APPROACHES. THEY FEEL

SOME SPARK IS NEEDED TO DEVELOP INTEREST AMONG RECIPIENTS.

31. THEY GLAD TO RECEIVE OUR EXPORT DATA AND WOULD APPRECIATE FULLEST POSSIBLE EXCHANGE. THEY DO NOT HAVE COMPREHENSIVE DELIVERY DATE BECAUSE PRIVATE FIRMS DO NOT PROVIDE, BUT WILL LOOK INTO THIS. THEY WOULD LIKE REGULAR EXPERT LEVEL CONSULTATIONS, AND FURTHER SUGGESTED BRINGING IN ITALIANS AND BELGIANS.  
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## Message Attributes

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